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The modern era of federal environmental regulation
arguably began when Congress passed the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).1 With 16 sections,
NEPA is one of the shortest federal environmental statutes. This
is unsurprising, as its mandate is also one of the simplest:
governmental agencies should assess the environmental impact of
their actions2 in the proposal stage.3 Because NEPA’s central
command seems logical and intuitive is probably the reason why,
after NEPA’s enactment, both international4 and foreign5
environmental law have adopted the requirement of
environmental assessments.6
The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”),
established under NEPA to advise the federal government on
environmental matters,7 issued guidelines in 1971 to assist federal

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347
[hereinafter NEPA]; e.g., John Toll, The Modern Era of Environmental
Regulation, 16 INTEGRATED ENV’T ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 807 (2020).
2 This article adopts the broad definition of “action” contained in the first
regulations promulgated under NEPA.
(National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§
1500–1508.28 [hereinafter 1978 Regulations]) ("Actions include new and
continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed,
assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised
agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals
(§§ 1506.8, 1508.17).").
3 NEPA § 4332(C)(i)–(v).
4 See, e.g., Directive 2001/42, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 June 2001 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes
on the Environment, annex 1, Paragraph (f), 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30, 36 [hereinafter
European Parliament Directive].
5 See, e.g., NEPA, International Environmental Impact Assessment, DEPT. OF
ENERGY, https://ceq.doe.gov/get-involved/international_impact_assessment.html
[https://perma.cc/26TF-LVED] (providing a list of EIA offices of other nations and
non-governmental bodies).
6 This article will use the term “environmental assessment” to refer generally to
any evaluation of the environmental impact of governmental action, whether part
of an environmental impact statement or otherwise. “EA” on the other hand will
refer to the specifically required stage under NEPA (defined in the 1978
Regulations, Section 1508.9) in which an initial “significance” assessment is made
to determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) or
to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”). 1978 Regulations, supra
note 2 (40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.).
7 NEPA § 4344(4).
1
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agencies in interpreting NEPA (the “1971 Guidelines”).8 These
Guidelines emphasized the need to be sensitive to the cumulative
effects of agency action, as “the effect of many Federal decisions
about a project or complex of projects can be individually limited
but cumulatively considerable.”9 Cumulative impact analysis (“CI
analysis”) is thus appropriate for any major federal action whose
impact, viewed in isolation, is immaterial, but when viewed
collectively with the impact of related actions is significant.
This article argues that CI analysis is a critical tool for
addressing global warming. This is because the largest
anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions in the
U.S. each contributes a vanishingly small portion of global GHG
emissions, which alone cannot rise to NEPA’s threshold of
“significance” requiring a “detailed statement…on the
environmental impact of the proposed action,”10 i.e., an
environmental impact statement (EIS). Yet there is no pollution
today in greater need of assessment and understanding than GHG
emissions, given the urgency of the impending catastrophe that
global warming could mean for our planet.11
Accordingly, this article attempts to illustrate the
centrality of cumulative impact in a NEPA analysis of the effect of
GHG emissions on global warming.12 The article challenges the
wisdom and the legality of the Trump-era CEQ’s 2020 repeal of CI
analysis contained in the regulations under NEPA, which have
been in place since 1978 (the “1978 Regulations”13). It also argues,
however, that the 1978 Regulations do not adequately address
climate analysis, and that the Biden Administration should now
Council on Environmental Quality, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions
Affecting the Environment, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724–29 (Apr. 23, 1971) [hereinafter,
1971 CEQ Guidelines] (The 1971 Guidelines were later revised in 1973 (38 Fed.
Reg. 20549–62 (Aug. 1, 1973)) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502)).
9 1971 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 8, at § 5(b).
10 NEPA § 102(2)(C)(i).
11 IPCC Report: ‘Code red’ for Human Driven Global Heating, Warns UN Chief,
UN NEWS (Aug. 9, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/08/1097362
[https://perma.cc/UHG3-NJ4A].
12 The NEPA process is just as critical for evaluating the effects of climate change
on agency actions (for the purpose of adapting agency action to climate change)
as it is for determining the effects of agency action on climate change (for the
purpose of mitigating climate change). This article focuses solely on NEPA’s use
in climate mitigation, not climate adaptation.
13 See 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at §§ 1508.7, 1508.18(a).
8
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undertake an entirely separate and new approach to climaterelated assessments. The new regulations should handle climate
assessments in a separate, streamlined way to produce the most
meaningful information on federal agencies’ individual and
collective contribution to global warming. In doing so, the
Administration will be giving itself a powerful tool to reach its
highly ambitious targets14 for overall GHG reductions from the
U.S. economy.
Part I of this article gives a brief history of the cumulative
impact concept in federal NEPA interpretation, attempting, in
particular, to demonstrate how the idea is inherent in the statute
itself and inseparable from it. Part II describes the special role that
CI analysis must play in analyzing GHG emissions in order to
make meaningful and informative environmental assessments of
global warming. It also reviews CEQ’s and the courts’
understanding of the role CI analysis plays in climate-related
NEPA assessments. Part III suggests a path forward that the
Biden Administration could adopt, through new NEPA
regulations, that would bolster, harmonize, and streamline the
agencies’ NEPA analyses of GHG emissions.
The issues discussed here, and in particular the
recommendations made in Part III, are not purely academic, nor
are they of merely procedural concern to federal agencies. Instead,
they go to the heart of the substantive, “action-forcing” purposes of
NEPA, as applied to the most critical environmental problem
facing the world today. The U.S. federal government, through
direct and indirect agency action, is responsible for enormous
quantities of GHG emissions.15 Our government is therefore a
major contributor to what one federal circuit court has warned
might be an impending “apocalypse.”16 There is no tool more
powerful than NEPA for assessing and communicating our
government’s contribution to that potential apocalypse. Yet federal
See Lisa Friedman, Somini Sengupta, & Coral Davenport, Biden, Calling for
Action, Commits U.S. to Halving Its Climate Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/climate/biden-climatechange.html?searchResultPosition=6 [https://perma.cc/FZ9E-8W2P].

14

See SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, CLIMATE REREGULATION IN A BIDEN
ADMINISTRATION 1 (Michael Burger & Daniel J. Metzger eds., 2020).
16 Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020).
15
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agencies have generally failed to engage in that communication
largely because, in their NEPA assessments, they often declare
that the effects of any particular agency action on global climate is
too small to measure and even matter. This failure to fully disclose
our government’s role in climate change is a moral failing, and it
is a clear violation of NEPA’s requirement to assess the cumulative
effects of an agency’s environmental harm when combined with
other related action. The Biden Administration can remedy this
dereliction with a fresh approach to climate-directed NEPA
assessments that force the agencies to make robust and
informative disclosures about their GHG emissions.17 NEPA can
then become a powerful tool in the Administration’s wheelhouse to
inform and drive its overall climate program.

I. The Definition and Development of Cumulative
Impact in NEPA Assessments
This part of the article introduces the history and
development of CI analysis. It begins with a brief discussion of CI
analysis in the context of an agency’s NEPA process. There follows
a description of the history of the idea, from the legislative history
of NEPA as recognized by two federal courts, through CEQ’s
initial, 1971 Guidance and the early cases that considered CI
analysis, culminating with the U.S. Supreme Court’s consideration
of CI analysis in Kleppe v. Sierra Club. The section describes
cumulative impact as mentioned in several sections of the 1978
Regulations, and concludes with a brief description of the
treatment of CI analysis in CEQ guidance. One objective of this
It should be noted that while the U.S. government is a major direct and indirect
emitter of greenhouse gases “GHGs”), it also has an enormous capacity to remove
carbon from the atmosphere, given its ownership, stewardship and regulation of
vast forests and agricultural land that can store, or “sequester,” carbon. The
sequestration of a volume of carbon over a period of time is just as relevant in a
NEPA analysis as is the emission of that same volume over the same time period.
Indeed, “emission” and “sequestration” can be seen as flip sides of the same coin.
Although this article does not explicitly refer to carbon sequestration, all
references here to “GHG emissions” or “net GHG emissions” are intended to mean
“GHG emissions net of sequestration,” and therefore admit of the possibility of
negative emissions when gross sequestration exceeds gross emissions. This is
particularly relevant in the hypothetical case study involving the U.S. Forest
Service (the “USFS”) in Part III of this article, because of the USFS’s management
of U.S. forests, an important carbon sink. See infra Part III.

17
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section is to demonstrate that CI analysis is inherently a part of
NEPA and NEPA assessments, and has been recognized as such
by the federal judiciary.
A. The Nature of CI Analysis and its Role in NEPA
Assessments
The success and influence of NEPA may lie in its simplicity.
Its core “action-forcing” intent is to force18 federal government
agencies to “include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement…[on] the environmental impact of the
proposed action.”19 The straightforwardness of the statute derives
from its seemingly non-controversial proposition: federal agencies
must consider the potential environmental harm that might arise
from all proposed actions—NEPA’s “look before you leap” mandate.
NEPA requires federal agencies to implement its policy
through adopting regulations. The 1978 Regulations codified and
harmonized agency practice in this regard.20 These Regulations
require all federal agencies to engage in an initial environmental
assessment (“EA”) at the inception of a proposal for any agency
action.21 If the EA results in a determination that the action could
“significantly” impact the human environment,22 then the agency
must prepare a more detailed environmental impact statement
(EIS) that compares possible environmental impacts from the
proposal with other alternative actions, including a “no-action”

See Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974)
(labelling this requirement of NEPA as “action forcing”).
19 NEPA § 102(2)(C).
20 NICHOLAS C. YOST, NEPA DESKBOOK 9 (Env’t Law Inst., 4th ed. 2014) (“CEQ’s
1978 NEPA regulations encapsulate the various procedural requirements, in
large part codifying case law and the administrative experience of NEPA’s early
years”).
21 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1503.
22 The “significance” determination should be made as to the context and intensity
of the impact. The intensity of the impact is evaluated according to a ten-factor
test, the seventh factor of which is “[w]hether the action is related to other actions
with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.” 7 C.F.R. §
650.4(k)(2)(vii) (2021). As will be discussed in this article, CI analysis should play
a central role in determining the “significance” of an impact and, therefore,
whether the agency must compile an EIS. See discussion infra Part III (C).
18
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proposal—i.e., the possibility of undertaking no action at all.23 If
no “significant” impacts are identified, the agency may issue a
Finding of No Significant Impact, or “FONSI”.24 The information
produced in the EIS then becomes part of a “record of decision" that
documents how the information produced in the EIS factored into
the agency’s decision to proceed.25
The 1971 Guidelines established much of the NEPA process
that was adopted into the 1978 Regulations. The Guidelines copied
NEPA’s simple, intuitive and non-controversial style, and
introduced concepts that seemed naturally part of the NEPA
mandate to give a “hard look”26 at possible environmental impacts
of proposed federal action. Those concepts have been reinforced,
not just in the 1978 Regulations, but also by the federal judiciary,
including the determination of a lead agency for the environmental
review, establishing the timing of the review “as early as possible,”
and a broad definition of federal “actions” to which NEPA applies.27
The 1971 Guidelines included the concept of “cumulative
impact”—the notion that “the effect of many Federal decisions
about a project or complex of projects can be individually limited
but cumulatively considerable.”28 A hypothetical proposal to build
a highway in segments is often used as an example29 to illustrate
CI analysis:30 If one were to consider the impacts associated with
the construction of each highway segment in isolation, one might
The 1978 Regulations also envision the possibility of “tiering” whereby agencies
produce general, programmatic EISs discussing the impacts of broad agency
programs or policies, so that the agency does not have to repeat that research
with every new agency action. 1978 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. The
“programmatic EIS” can then be incorporated by reference into any project- or
site-specific EIS. 1978 Regulations, supra note 2 at § 1508.28.
24 1978 Regulations, supra note 2 at § 1508.9(a)(1).
25 1978 Regulations, supra note 2 at § 1502.20.
26 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (1972)
(adopting the phrase “hard look” from WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1160
(D.C. Cir. 1969)).
27 See 1971 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 8.
28 Id.
29 E.g., Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc. v. Texas
Highway Dep’t, 446 F.2d 1013, 1014 (1971) (NEPA review of highway constructed
in three segments).
30 See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989,
994 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the hypothetical deposition of sediment in a river to
illustrate CI analysis).
23
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conclude that no segment will result in a significant impact, and
thus no EIS is required. A more logical approach, however, would
be to assess the cumulative impact of all the segments together,
because that impact is highly relevant to the decision whether to
build the highway in the first place. (The practice of attempting to
avoid drafting an EIS by treating its constituent parts as
independent, unrelated activities is sometimes called
“segmentation.”31)
It should come as no surprise, then, that CI analysis has
been easily adopted in subsequent CEQ guidelines, in the 1978
Regulations, and by the federal judiciary. It has also been adopted
in both international law32 and in the EIA law of foreign
countries33. Although there has been debate over the years as to
the scope of impacts that should be included in the definition of
“cumulative impact,” the concept itself was never seriously
questioned until the promulgation of revised NEPA Regulations in
2020 by the Trump-era CEQ (the “2020 Regulations”).34
B. Early use of the words “cumulative impact”
courts

1.

Legislative history of NEPA cited by two federal

Although NEPA does not mention the need for CI analysis
explicitly, the entire Act responds to Congressional concern that
the environmental problems facing the nation at the time were
caused by incremental acts that collectively degrade the
environment. For this reason, two federal courts have concluded
that CI analysis is part of the NEPA statute itself.
“Segmentation” is a concept often referred to in connection with New York’s
“Little NEPA,” the N.Y. State Environmental Quality Review Act. State
Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Tit. 6, § 617.2
(2020) [hereinafter SEQRA]; see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENV’T CONSERVATION, THE
SEQR HANDBOOK 53 (N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, 4th ed. 2020).
32 See, e.g., HUSSEIN ABAZA, RON BISSET & BARRY SADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: TOWARDS AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH 41 & 52–56 (UNEP 2004).
33 See, e.g., European Parliament Directive, supra note 4.
34 Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Forest
Service says that cumulative impacts from non-Federal actions need not be
analyzed because the Federal government cannot control them. That
interpretation is inconsistent with 40 C.F.R § 1508.7 [of the 1978 Regulations]
which specifically requires such analysis.”).
31

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol39/iss1/8

8

2022]

CUMULATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS

219

S.C.R.A.P. v U.S.
The first was the D.C. Circuit Court when, in 1974, it
reviewed Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States (“S.C.R.A.P. v. U.S.”).35 The Court
had previously ordered the Interstate Commerce Commission (the
“ICC”) to prepare an EIS in connection with its decision to increase
the rates charged for shipping both virgin and recycled materials.36
The EIS was supposed to analyze the environmental harm caused
by charging more for shipping recycled materials—i.e., harm
caused by increasing the cost of beneficial recycling.37 In response
to the court order, the ICC prepared a cursory statement that
studied only the effect of the proposed 3% increase in rates for
recycled materials, and concluded it was insignificant.38 The D.C.
Circuit held that the ICC should employ CI analysis to determine
the effects of the overall rate structure on the shipping of recycled
materials compared to virgin material.39 In the Court’s words, the
ICC should not have limited its analysis “to the marginal impact
of the most recent rate increase with no discussion of whether the
underlying rate structure itself significantly affects the
environment.”40 The Court held this to be a failure to perform a
“cumulative impacts” analysis and thus a violation of NEPA.41
Importantly, the Court did not cite to the 1971 Guidelines
(discussed in the next subsection) as authority for requiring the CI
analysis, but rather cited Congress’s intent in passing NEPA itself.
Referring to NEPA’s legislative history, the Court wrote:
Such cumulative impacts must be considered in NEPA
statements. The Senate report on the passage of NEPA makes this
clear:
“Environmental problems are only dealt with when they reach
crisis proportions. Public desires and aspirations are seldom
Students Challenging Regul. Agency Proc. (S.C.R.A.P.) v. U.S., 371 F. Supp.
1291 (D.D.C. 1974), rev’d sub nom, 422 U.S. 289 (1975). This was in fact the third
time that the case had come before the D.C. District Court, and the third opinion
authored by the Court in the case.
36 Id. at 1293–94.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1304.
40 Id.
41 Id.
35
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consulted. Important decisions concerning the use and the shape
of man's future environment continue to be made in small but
steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the
recognized mistakes of previous decades.”42
The Court further stated that the requirements around CI
analysis contained in CEQ’s 1971 Guidance merely responds to the
Congressional mandate to address the problem of the “small but
steady increments which perpetuate” environmental errors.43
NRDC v. Callaway
The Second Circuit, too, has grounded CI analysis in the
statute itself, giving the concept of cumulative impact a major
boost. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,44
the U.S. Navy prepared an EIS in advance of its plan to discharge
highly polluted dredge material from the Thames River near the
Naval Base in Groton, Connecticut into Long Island Sound near
Fishers Island. The NRDC and other environmental groups sued,
claiming the toxins would disburse from the aquatic dumpsite and
result in massive fish kills.45 They alleged that the Navy’s EIS was
insufficient in a number of respects, in part for failing to include
the cumulative effects from discharges of other dredging that the
Navy contemplated.46 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut, however, had found for the Navy47 on virtually all
issues presented, including the issue of cumulative impact, stating
that “[t]he duty to discuss the impact of all possible pollutants
cannot be imposed on each isolated project.”48 The Second Circuit,
however, emphatically rejected this view:
We believe that this represents too constricted a view of the
informative function of an EIS and of the duty of the responsible
agency in preparing it. . . . [A]n agency may not . . . treat . . . a
project as an isolated ‘single-shot’ venture in the face of persuasive
evidence that it is but one of several substantially similar
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 5 (1969)).
Id. (“The advisory guidelines for implementation of NEPA issued by CEQ are
responsive to this congressional intent.”).
44 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
45 Id. at 82, 85.
46 Id. at 87.
47 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 1263, 1292 (D. Conn.
1974), rev’d in part, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
48 Id. at 1280.
42
43
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operations, each of which will have the same polluting effect in the
same area. To ignore the prospective cumulative harm under such
circumstances could be to risk ecological disaster.49
Like the S.C.R.A.P. v. U.S. Court, the Second Circuit did not
cite to 1971 CEQ Guidelines in making this determination. Rather,
it cited the same legislative history of NEPA as the S.C.R.A.P. v.
U.S. Court (the Senate Report’s “steady increments” language) had
for implicitly mandating cumulative analyses in environmental
assessments:
As was recognized by Congress at the time of passage of
NEPA, a good deal of our present air and water pollution has
resulted from the accumulation of small amounts of pollutants
added to the air and water by a great number of individual,
unrelated sources.
"Important decisions concerning the use and the shape of
man's future environment continue to be made in small but steady
increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the recognized
mistakes of previous decades.”
S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
The Second Circuit then continued:
NEPA was, in large measure, an attempt by Congress to instill
in the environmental decision-making process a more
comprehensive approach so that long term and cumulative effects
of small and unrelated decisions could be recognized, evaluated
and either avoided, mitigated, or accepted as the price to be paid
for the major federal action under consideration.50
In other words, the requirement for federal agencies to
undertake analyses of the cumulative effect of their decisions in
appropriate cases is inherent in NEPA itself.
2. First CEQ Guidelines on NEPA assessments

49
50

Callaway, 524 F.2d at 88.
Id.

11

222

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

As stated in Section A, the first guidelines that CEQ issued
in connection with the Act in 1971 (the “1971 Guidelines”)51
mention the concept of cumulative impact in ways that suggest the
idea is central to NEPA analysis.52 The Guidelines were issued
primarily for the purpose of codifying agency practice with respect
to interpreting and elaborating on various terms used in the
statute.53 Although the phrase “cumulative impact” is not
contained in NEPA, CEQ determined that the concept is implicit
in the words “major action significantly affecting,” in NEPA
Section 102(2)(C):
[This phrase] is to be construed by agencies with a view to the
overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed . . . and of further
actions contemplated . . . . In considering what constitutes major
action significantly affecting the environment, agencies should
bear in mind that the effect of many Federal decisions about a
project or complex of projects can be individually limited but
cumulative considerable.54
The 1971 CEQ also used the word “cumulative” in interpreting
Section 102(C)(iv) of the Act, which essentially requires that
environmental impact statements adopt a long-term view of
impacts:
“The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall-- . . . (C) include in every recommendation or report…a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-- . . . (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment

CEQ revised the 1971 Guidelines on August 1, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (Aug.
1st, 1973); The provisions on cumulative impact largely remained the same. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (“In considering what constitutes major action
significantly affecting the environment, agencies should bear in mind that the
effect of many Federal decisions about a project or complex of projects can be
individually limited but cumulative considerable.”).
52 The word “cumulative” is used two times and “cumulatively” is used two times
in the 1971 Guidance. 1971 Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. at 7724–25.
53 Yost, supra note 20 at ix.
54 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a). Here, the CEQ gives the first indication of what actions
should be jointly considered so that their impacts can be collectively studied: a
“complex of projects” should be considered together in one assessment; Id.
51
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and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity .
. . .”55
In explaining the meaning of the statutory words “the
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,”
the Guidelines state that this relationship requires agencies to
employ CI analysis.56 “This in essence requires the agency to assess
the action for cumulative and long-term effects from the
perspective that each generation is trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations.”57
The cumulative effects of agency actions, rather than their
isolated effects, are more likely to be of consequence to future
generations. Thus, CEQ emphasizes here the need to forecast the
cumulative or total impact that will arise in the long term through
government action that is repeated into the future.
3. First cases mentioning “cumulative impact”
CEQ’s guidelines are advisory only and do not bind the
agencies58 or the courts.59 Nonetheless, courts have regularly held
that CI analysis is a natural and necessary element of NEPA
assessments. They have consistently required federal agencies in
appropriate circumstances to engage in CI analyses and to review
related actions or proposals as part of the analysis.
Two such cases have been described in Section B(1),
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway and S.C.R.A.P
v. U.S. Both cases held that CI analysis was suggested in the
legislative history of NEPA.60 A close reading of the remaining
opinions on CI analysis reveals that they seldom cite a direction or
mandate from CEQ to apply CI analysis. Rather, many courts
simply cite the CEQ’s statement of fact: “[T]he effect of many
Federal decisions about a project or complex of projects can be
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iv) (2012) (emphasis added).
1971 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 8 at 7725.
57 Id.
58 Subsequent CEQ guidance normally contains a disclaimer that it is not legally
binding. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, CONSIDERING
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT iii (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 HANDBOOK].
59 Callaway, 524 F.2d. at 6 n.8.
60 S.C.R.A.P., 371 F. Supp. at 1293-94; Callaway, 524 F.2d at 88.
55
56
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individually limited but cumulatively considerable.”61 Thus, the
requirement to use CI analysis flowed from the courts’ agreement
with the statement of fact that a compartmentalized review of
impacts can be misleading, not with a legal conclusion.62 Three
cases basing CI analysis on NEPA itself are discussed below.
The first case to quote the “cumulatively considerable”
language from the 1971 Guidance was Boston v. Volpe in 1972.63
In that case, the City of Boston filed for an injunction against the
Port Authority to halt expansion of an airport within the city,
claiming in part that the Port Authority failed to undertake a
NEPA review of the proposal. The First Circuit, holding for the
defendant, found that the federal government was insufficiently
involved in the project to trigger NEPA review.64 But in dicta,
appearing in a footnote without any comment, the Court recited
CEQ’s “cumulatively considerable” statement, apparently as a
caution that separate federal actions, when viewed collectively,
can in other cases be significant enough to be “federal action”
under NEPA.65
The need for a discussion of cumulative impact in EISs was
judicially ordered in a case as early as 1973. In that year, a federal
court in North Carolina reviewed a petition by the Natural
Resources Defense Council (the “NRDC”) against the United State
Department of Agriculture’s Soil Conservation Service (the “SCS”)
to enjoin the construction of a watershed project involving the
channelization of a 66-mile stretch of the Chicod Creek.66 Although
the SCS had prepared an EIS describing the environmental
impacts of the project, the court held the EIS to be deficient for
several reasons.67 Among them was the failure to discuss the
cumulative effects of the project when considered with other
channelization projects in eastern North Carolina.68 The Court
noted the possible cumulative effects that similar projects on other
1971 CEQ Guidelines, supra note 8, at 7724 (emphasis added).
A LexisNexis search on April 21, 2021 revealed that 14 federal cases have used
the cited statement on cumulative impact dating originally from the 1971
Guidance. Some of these cases did not identify the source of the statement.
63 City of Boston. v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 n.5 (1st Cir. 1972).
64 Id. at 255-56.
65 Id.
66 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Grant, 355 F.Supp. 280, 283 (E.D.N.C., 1973).
67 Id. at 286-90.
68 Id. at 286-90.
61
62
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streams would have on the sedimentation and the accumulation of
nutrients in the Tar-Pamlico River Basin, as well as the
cumulative impact of the drainage projects on hardwood timber
and groundwater resources.69 In doing so, it quoted the CEQ’s
factual statement that the effect of a decision about a project or a
complex of projects “can be individually limited but cumulatively
considerable.”70
Another 1973 case mentioning the need for CI analysis is
Jones v. Lynn.71 This case involved a series of related building
projects in Boston that were supported in part by federal financing
through the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”).72 Although the First Circuit cited to the 1971 Guidelines,
it ultimately found that simple logic and expediency required CI
analysis; “[i]n such a case [of future planned building
construction], it would not seem sensible to adopt the piecemeal
approach which HUD seeks to adopt.”73
4. Kleppe v. Sierra Club
Kleppe v. Sierra Club represents the first opportunity for
the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on the meaning of “cumulative
impact.”74 In that case, the Sierra Club and other environmental
organizations had brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, seeking to compel the Department of the
Interior to produce a region-wide comprehensive EIS on its plans
to lease lands for coal mining in the Northern Great Plains.75 The
plaintiffs lost before the District Court and appealed. 76 Before the
D.C. Circuit Court issued its opinion, the Defendant proceeded to
approve plans for mining in the Powder River Coal Basin in the
region in question, but based on an EIS that covered just the
Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 288.
71 Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 890 (1st Cir. 1973).
72 Id. at 886-87.
73 Id. at 891. Other early NEPA cases requiring CI Analysis include Swain v.
Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[C]umulative effects can and must
be considered on an ongoing basis”) and Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. v. Butz, 541
F.2d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir. 1976) (requiring CI Analysis of multiple logging projects
in the Minnesota Boundary Waters Canoe Area).
74 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 395.
69
70
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Basin.77 The Circuit Court issued an injunction against the
Defendant and remanded the case to the District Court for further
proceedings on whether a region-wide EIS was required.78 Upon
petition, however, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and
granted certiorari to decide, inter alia, whether the Interior
Department should have produced the region-wide EIS.79
The Supreme Court held that the region-wide
comprehensive EIS was not required, because no proposals were
pending to develop mining in the region beyond the four in the
Powder River Coal Basin.80 Nonetheless, the Court, in dicta,
reaffirmed the basic principle that a comprehensive EIS is
required when multiple proposals are on the table:
“We begin by stating our general agreement with respondents’
basic premise that [NEPA] section 102(2)(C) may require a
comprehensive impact statement in certain situations where
several proposed actions are pending at the same time. NEPA
announced a national policy of environmental protection and
placed a responsibility upon the Federal Government to further
specific environmental goals by ‘all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy.’***Thus,
when several proposals for coal-related actions that will have
cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are
pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental
consequences must be considered together. Only through
comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency
evaluate different courses of action.”81
Once again, a court—this time the highest in the land—
affirmed the concept that cumulative impact is an inherent part of
the NEPA environmental assessment process. In doing so, it cited
only the text of NEPA itself, without reference to CEQ guidance or
any other authority. It found that the requirement for cumulative
effect analysis flows from the statutory mandate to use “all
practicable means” to further NEPA’s environmental goals.82
Id.
Id. at 395-96.
79 Id. at 395.
80 Id. at 414.
81 Id. at 409–10 (1976).
82 See id. at 409.
77
78
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5. Post Kleppe
The requirement of an EI assessment, at least in principle,
has been adopted into the holding of virtually all NEPA cases that
have considered the issue since then. The concept has also found
reception by courts confronted with the obligation of federal
agencies to evaluate the effects of GHG emissions under NEPA. 83
A few of these climate change NEPA cases are discussed in Part II,
below. This part of the article will first discuss the 1978
Regulations and then the further refinement of the definition of
cumulative impact under subsequent CEQ guidance.
C. The 1978 Regulations on Cumulative Impact
CEQ promulgated the first NEPA regulations in 1978.84
Like the NEPA statute, they are a model of brevity and clarity,
particularly when compared to other environmental regulations.
Because drafting the regulations occurred only a short time after
the 1976 decision in Kleppe, the regulations were heavily
influenced by that decision.85
The regulations are divided into nine different parts.86 Part
1502 sets forth the requirements of an environment impact
statement (an “EIS”).87 Section 1502.1, “Purpose,” states simply
that an EIS “shall provide full and fair discussion of significant
See Jessica Wentz & Michael Burger, Five Points About the Proposed Revisions
to CEQ’s NEPA Regulations, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLIMATE L. BLOG (Jan. 10, 2020),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/01/10/five-points-about-theproposed-revisions-to-ceqs-nepa-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/L5E4-AX8G].
84
CEQ
NEPA
Regulations,
NEPA.GOV,
https://ceq.doe.gov/lawsregulations/regulations.html [https://perma.cc/H87X-CJHB].
85 See 1971 CEQ Guidelines supra, at 8 (demonstrating that CI assessment has
been understood to be part of NEPA itself, in part because of legislative concern
about “incremental” nature of environmental harm); see COUNCIL ON ENV’T
QUALITY, GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF PAST ACTIONS IN CUMULATIVE
EFFECTS ANALYSIS (2005) [hereinafter 2005 CEQ GUIDANCE] (citing portions of
Kleppe v. Sierra Club and showing where they are incorporated into the 1987
regulations). But see Edward McTiernan et. al, CEQ Finalizes Comprehensive
Changes to NEPA Regulations, ARNOLD & PORTER: ENV’T EDGE (July 30, 2020),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2020/07/ceqfinalizes-changes-to-nepa-regs [https://perma.cc/3CW7-YP5Q] (observing that the
1978 Regulations include the concept of cumulative impacts because it was
mentioned in Kleppe v. Sierra Club).
86 1978 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28.
87 Id. at §§ 1502.1-1502.25.
83
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environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or
minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human
environment.”88
The final part of the 1978 Regulations is entitled
“Terminology and Index.”89 CEQ used this section to deliver much
of the substance of the Regulations. It is here that the concept of
cumulative impact90 is defined as “the impact on the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or
person undertakes such other actions.”91
The word “cumulative” is mentioned in other sections of the
1971 Regulations that are important for an understanding of the
use of CI analysis. Perhaps the most critical section is that which
defines the “significance” threshold that must be met before
requiring the drafting of an EIS.92 That threshold is set forth in
NEPA Section 102(2)(C): The federal action must be “significantly”
affecting the quality of the human environment.93 The 1978
Regulations set forth factors that must be weighed to determine
“significance,” and the concept of cumulative impacts plays a role.94
Accordingly, subsection 1508.27(b)(7) defines one factor to weigh
in determining the “intensity” of the impact to be “[w]hether the
action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but
cumulatively significant impacts.”95 This clause is also important
because it defines the scope of actions that must be considered
collectively under a cumulative impact assessment: The actions
must be “related” to the federal action under consideration.

Id. at § 1502.1.
Id. at § 1508.
90 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.8(b) (explaining “[e]ffects and impacts
as used in these regulations are synonymous.”).
91 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.7.
92 See YOST, supra note 20, at 13 (“The term ‘significantly’ presents the threshold
for the EIS requirement, and no other term in NEPA has been the subject of more
attention.”).
93 42 U.S.C. 4332(c).
94 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.27.
95 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.27(b)(7) (emphasis added).
88
89
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Unfortunately, however, the Regulations give no guidance
on the meaning of “related.” This, then, became the task of future
CEQs, as discussed in Section (D), below.
When these Regulations were promulgated in 1978, this
definition of “cumulative impact” was hardly controversial,
because it followed the definition of cumulative impact first
introduced in the 1971 Guidelines and adopted by the agencies and
the courts. One possible exception to this might be the inclusion of
the words “or person” to describe the scope of the actors whose
“actions” might be included in a cumulative impact assessment.96
In other words, an EIS must, where appropriate, consider nongovernmental actions in a cumulative impact assessment,
provided the other requirements for including impacts are met.
The Ninth Circuit reinforced this requirement in Resources Ltd.,
Inc. v. Robertson when it rejected the U.S. Forest Service’s
argument that it did not need to consider private action in its CI
analysis because it had no control over private actions.97
D. Subsequent definition of “cumulative impact”
1. Clinton-era CEQ Handbook on EI analysis
The Clinton-era CEQ took a major step forward in
promoting CI analysis by issuing a handbook focused exclusively
on that analysis (the “Handbook”).98 This 122-page document
brought the understanding of CI analysis to an entirely new level
of science and thoughtfulness. These qualities are on display in the
definition of cumulative impact which the guidance offers:
“Cumulative effects result from spatial (geographic) and temporal
(time) crowding of environmental perturbations. The effects of
human activities will accumulate when a second perturbation
occurs at a site before the ecosystem can fully rebound from the
effect of the first perturbation.”99
1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.7.
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Forest
Service says that cumulative impacts from non-Federal actions need not be
analyzed because the Federal government cannot control them. That
interpretation is inconsistent with 40 C.F.R § 1508.7 [of the 1978 Regulations]
which specifically requires such analysis.”).
98 See generally 1997 HANDBOOK, supra note 58 (calling it a handbook, CEQ means
to give it less authority than even guidance).
99 Id. at 7.
96
97
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In the Handbook, CEQ paints the breadth of CI analysis for
NEPA assessments, emphasizing that it has a role in several
NEPA stages, such as defining the affected environment,
determining environmental consequences and comparing
alternatives.100 The Handbook systematically tackled for the first
time some of the most difficult issues that CI analysis entails, in
particular the issue of scoping, or determining the universe of
other actions that should be included in the CI analysis.101
In many ways, scoping is the key to analyzing cumulative
effects. It provides the best opportunity of identifying important
cumulative effect issues, setting appropriate boundaries for
analysis and identifying relevant past, present and future actions.
“Scoping allows the NEPA practitioner to ‘count what counts.’”102
The Handbook speaks only in passing about the role of CI
analysis or even NEPA generally in dealing with climate impacts
of federal action.103 Some might argue this is in keeping with the
Clinton Administration’s general ambivalence toward climate
change.104 But the Handbook’s deconstruction of the EI process
highlights the uneasy fit between climate change and traditional
CI analysis, and this could also be the reason that climate change
is not materially addressed in the Handbook.105 Nonetheless, some
of the suggestions developed around EI analysis in the Guidelines

Id. at v.
See id. at 11-21.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 7 (identifying climate change as a problem suited for CI analysis)
(“Nonetheless, the importance of acid rain, climate change, and other cumulative
effects problems has resulted in many efforts to undertake and improve the
analysis of cumulative effects.”).
104 See SHEILA M. CAVANAGH ET AL., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DURING THE
CLINTON YEARS 1-7 (2001).
105 See 1997 HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at vi (“Determining the cumulative
environmental consequences of an action requires delineating cause-and-effect
relationships between the multiple actions and the resources, ecosystems, and
human communities of concern. Analysts must tease from the complex networks
of possible interactions those that substantially affect the resources.”). This
article will argue in the following part, infra Part II, that “delineating cause-andeffect relationships” between GHG emissions and climate changes is an
exceedingly difficult endeavor best left to specialized organizations of climate
scientists.
100
101
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are applicable in the analysis of GHG emissions,106 as is discussed
in more detail in Part III.
2. Bush-era CEQ Guidance on cumulative effects
In 2005, the George W. Bush-era CEQ issued “Guidance on
the Consideration of Past Actions in Cumulative Effects Analysis”
(the “2005 CEQ Guidance”).107 Unlike the Handbook, this short
Guidance does not mention climate change at all, but it repeats
several times a theme, grounded in a “rule of reason,” that should
be useful in assessing climate effects. Deciding the extent to which
an agency should include past actions in its CI analysis depends
on “the extent that they [i.e., past actions] are relevant and useful
in analyzing whether the reasonably foreseeable effects of the
agency proposal for action and its alternatives may have a
continuing, additive and significant relationship to those
effects.”108 In a different passage, citing the 1978 Regulations, the
CEQ says: “Agencies should ensure that their NEPA process
produces environmental information that is useful to
decisionmakers and the public by reducing the ‘accumulation of
extraneous background data’ and by ‘emphasiz[ing] real
environmental issues and alternatives.”109
Indeed, there is probably no aspect of a NEPA analysis
where application of the rule of reason is more critical than in CI
analysis. This is particularly true of scoping for CI analysis. Any
rule-based, prescriptive regulation applicable to the scoping of CI
analyses is likely to fail. One must find a golden mean on a caseby-case basis between the extremes of over-inclusiveness and
under-inclusiveness, both of which will produce meaningless
results. The correct scope must always be that which produces the
most important and meaningful information to the reader.110
II. The Special Role of CI Analysis in Climate-Related
Assessments, and the Acknowledgement of that Role by the
CEQ and the Courts.

1997 HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at v.
See 2005 CEQ HANDBOOK, supra note 85.
108 Id.
109 2005 CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 85, at 2 (citing 1978 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §
1500.2(b)).
110 Infra Part III.
106
107
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A. The analytical issue: The One Percent Problem
As demonstrated by NEPA’s history, the purpose behind
introducing CI analysis into an EIS is to obtain a meaningful
understanding of the environmental impact of a federal action
when combined with other related government or private actions.
By requiring CI analysis, the law guards against the human
tendency to compartmentalize or “segment” environmental review
in order to focus on the environmental consequence of only one
agency action and to miss the bigger picture of the effect of
combined actions.
The human tendency to discount or ignore segmented
environmental harms is nowhere more evident than in the political
discussion of climate change. One argument often repeated to
dismiss concern over GHG emissions is that any individual source
is always responsible for an insignificantly small portion of global
GHG emissions.111 The argument is applied not only to counter
objections to further emissions of GHGs, but also in opposition to
measures to reduce emissions. In addition, the argument is not
limited to the political sphere but is also found in scholarly, or
scholarly-looking, articles.112
In 2011 two Vanderbilt Law professors gave the problem an
apt name: “The One Percent Problem.” 113 The opening paragraph
of their article succinctly describes the underlying argument and
its fallacy when applied to the problem of climate change:
Parties frequently seek exemption from regulation on the
ground that they contribute only a very small share to a problem.
See MADELEINE SIEGEL & ALEXANDER LOZNAK, SURVEY OF GREENHOUSE GAS
CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS FOR FOSSIL FUEL-RELATED PROJECTS 2017-2018 2728 (2019).
112 See KEN GIRARDIN & ANNETTE BROCKS, GREEN OVERLOAD: NEW YORK STATE’S
RATEPAYER-ZAPPING RENEWABLE ENERGY MANDATE 9 (2016), (attacking New York
State’s efforts to transition to renewable energy with the predictable argument
and comparison to China) (“Yet even taken on its own terms, the new policy’s
impact will be microscopic in global terms. When fully implemented, the Clean
Energy Standard is expected to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in 2030 by 23.6
million metric tons—an amount that, while seemingly impressive, equates to less
than 0.3 percent of CO2 emissions in China alone as of 2014").
113 Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011).
111
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These “one percent arguments” are not inherently questionable; it
can be efficient to exclude relatively small contributors. These
arguments also garner broad acceptance in part because they
exploit cognitive biases that induce individuals to discount or
ignore small values. But, when a regulatory problem can be solved
only by regulating small contributors, accepting one percent
arguments creates what we call the one percent problem. This
Article shows that this general problem for regulation has
particularly damaging effects on climate change policy: The global
character of the climate change problem allows many sources of
carbon emissions to make one percent arguments, but the climate
problem cannot be solved without attending to these sources.114
Thus, if the One Percent Argument is allowed into any
global warming debate, it nullifies objections to even the largest
emitters of GHGs in the U.S. or anywhere else, simply because any
particular project emits less than one percent of all GHG emissions
worldwide.115 The argument also thwarts any finding of
“significance” in any climate change-related EA under NEPA, thus
becoming a pretext for issuing a FONSI. On the other hand, when
the requirement of CI analysis compels federal agencies to describe
cumulative harm caused by more contributors than just the one
agency action under review, it is forcing them away from the
“cognitive biases that induce individuals to discount or ignore
small values,” and counter the human tendency to view small
environmental impacts as “essentially zero.”116
The remainder of this Part II describes the recent history of
NEPA climate assessment. It demonstrates how opponents of
climate assessment employ the One Percent Argument—i.e., how
they “exploit cognitive biases that induce individuals to discount
Id. at 1385.
See CENTER FOR GLOB. DEV., CGD Ranks CO2 Emissions from Power Plant
Worldwide,
EUREKALERT!
(Nov.
14,
2007),
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-11/cfgd-crc111207.php
[https://perma.cc/W79J-83V9]. To help grasp the magnitude of the One Percent
Problem, compare, for example, the CO2 emissions of the largest single power
plant in the U.S. with total worldwide power plant emissions of CO2: The largest
single source of CO2 emissions in the U. S. in 2007 was estimated to be the Scherer
electric power plant in Juliet, Georgia, at 25.3 million tons; Id. at 2. Power
generation throughout the world that year emitted approximately 10 billion tons.
Scherer’s contribution was thus “only” 0.253% of the total CO2 emissions. Id.
116 Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 113, at 1385, 1401.
114
115
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or ignore small values.”117 The next subsection, subsection B,
demonstrates how CEQ has used CI analysis to combat those
biases; and the following two subsections describe how federal
agencies and federal courts, respectively, have done the same.
Subsection E demonstrates how the Trump-era CEQ “repealed” CI
analysis in its effort to weaken or even eliminate NEPA review
related to climate change.
B. CEQ’s Acknowledgement of the One Percent Problem in the
2016 Guidance
The CEQ under President Obama was the first to fully
acknowledge the importance of CI analysis for any environmental
assessment related to climate change (a “climate assessment”) and
GHG emissions. In 2016, the CEQ issued NEPA guidance
dedicated to the issue of climate change, entitled “Guidance on
Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of
Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews”
(the “2016 Guidance”).118 In it, the CEQ recognized and eloquently
addressed the One Percent Problem head-on:
Climate change results from the incremental addition of GHG
emissions from millions of individual sources, which collectively
have a large impact on a global scale. CEQ recognizes that the
totality of climate change impacts is not attributable to any single
action, but are exacerbated by a series of actions including actions
taken pursuant to decisions of the Federal Government. Therefore,
a statement that emissions from a proposed Federal action
represent only a small fraction of global emissions is essentially a
statement about the nature of the climate change challenge, and is
not an appropriate basis for deciding whether or to what extent to
consider climate change impacts under NEPA. Moreover, these
comparisons are also not an appropriate method for characterizing
the potential impacts associated with a proposed action and its
alternatives and mitigations because this approach does not reveal
anything beyond the nature of the climate change challenge itself:
the fact that diverse individual sources of emissions each make a
117

Id.
COUNCIL

ON ENV’T QUALITY, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, GUIDANCE ON
CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE IN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REVIEWS [hereinafter 2016
GUIDANCE].

118
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relatively small addition to global atmospheric
concentrations that collectively have a large impact.119

235
GHG

CEQ later addressed the centrality of CI analysis for GHG
emissions, stating that “all GHG emissions contribute to
cumulative climate change impacts…[T]he analysis of the effects
of GHG emissions is essentially a cumulative effects analysis.”120
The 2016 Guidance acknowledges that emission volumes
are a “proxy” for climate change impacts.121 This is a logical
consequence of the fungible nature of GHG emissions—the fact
that emissions anywhere contribute to the same impacts. Since
volumes should be “proxies” for climate change impacts, CEQ
recommended that the agencies provide only a “qualitative
summary discussion” of the impacts of GHG emissions on climate,
and to base this discussion on authoritative reports.122 This, too, is
sensible, since it relieves each agency from the redundant task of
linking specific net GHG emissions to specific climate
consequences—an exercise that scientists at such organizations as
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (the “IPCC”) or
the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP)123
are far better equipped to undertake. Lightening the burden of
describing climate impacts permits the agencies to focus on the
more critical task of employing quantification tools to estimate
GHG emission volumes.124 A better solution might be to implement
a tiered approach, assigning to the USGCRP or to CEQ itself the
task of drafting a programmatic EIS125 that matches net GHG
volumes with specific climate consequences, based upon
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 17.
121 Id. at 10.
122 See, e.g., Id. at 10.
123See generally DONALD J. WUEBBLES ET AL., CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT:
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOL. I (Linda O. Mearns et al. eds., U.S.
GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM 2017) (exemplifying an organization that expertly
links GHG emissions to specific climate consequences through a cooperative effort
of thirteen agencies that produces reports on global changes generally, including
climate change) [hereinafter USGCRP 2017].
124 See 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 12 (discussing “quantification tools”).
125 See 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1502.20 (showing that the 1978
Regulations and the CEQs of all administrations have encouraged the practice of
“tiering” multiple EISs from broad, “programmatic” environmental assessments
associated with, for example, agency policy positions, to specific assessments,
such as for site-specific projects).
119
120
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authoritative sources; the agencies could then incorporate the
programmatic description of climate impacts by reference. Part III
of this article explores this possibility.
Unfortunately, other than stating that all climate
assessment necessarily is cumulative impact assessment and
exhorting the agencies to focus on calculating net volumes on GHG
emissions and not climate effects, the 2016 Guidance went no
further in breaking new ground for climate assessment under
NEPA.126 For example, it declined to establish or give guidance on
volumetric thresholds of GHG emissions that “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,” the threshold for
drafting an EIS under NEPA Section 102(2)(C).127 It also declined
to give guidance on how to “scope” the CI Analysis of Climate
Assessments—i.e., what other sources of sources of GHG emissions
should be considered in defining “cumulative” effect. CEQ’s
hesitancy might have stemmed from its reluctance to appear to
make binding decisions for the agencies, when it does not have that
authority.128
That hesitancy is perhaps best represented in the 2016
Guidance in its occasional references to the discretion that the
agencies have in the NEPA process. For example: “Agencies have
discretion in how they tailor their individual NEPA reviews to
accommodate the approach outlined in this guidance, consistent
with the CEQ Regulations and their respective implementing
procedures and policies.”129 As the Guidance itself states,130 there
are well-established methodologies and tools developed by the
scientific community for determining volumes of net GHG
emissions for many practices common to the agencies, particularly
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. But to grant the agencies
broad discretion in fashioning all aspects of their Climate
Assessments simply invites them to define key terms (such as
“significance” and “scope”) in such a way as to avoid Climate
Assessments altogether.131

See generally 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118.
See generally id.
128 See Callaway, 524 F.2d 86 n.8.
129 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 3.
130 Id. at 12.
131 This is what happened in the years following issuance of the 2016 Guidance.
126
127
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Whatever its flaws, the 2016 Guidance represents a
significant first step in analyzing how NEPA can best be used in
climate assessments, especially with its insight that all NEPA
climate assessment is CI analysis.132 Unfortunately, as discussed
below in Subsection D, the Trump-era CEQ derailed development
of both CI analysis and NEPA review of climate impacts generally
by revoking the 1978 Regulations and replacing them with a
revision that is hostile to both. The CEQ undertook this revision in
spite of – and arguably, because of- ongoing judicial development
of CI analysis for NEPA climate reviews, a development which is
discussed in the Subsection D, below.
C. Agency Adoption of CI Analysis for Climate Impacts of
Federal Action
A full review of how federal agencies have dealt with
climate change in their NEPA assessments, as well as the extent
to which they adopted principles from the 2016 Guidance into their
own procedures, is beyond the scope of this article. Happily,
however, the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (the “Sabin
Center”) has produced an excellent survey of the agencies’
diligence in assessing the GHG emissions from fossil fuel-related
projects between 2017 and 2018 (the “Sabin Center Survey”).133
Given the GHG-intensive nature of fossil fuel projects and the
record levels of U.S. fossil fuel production in 2018,134 this survey
might shed light on the extent to which the federal government in
general has embraced NEPA climate assessments and how much
it contributed to global warming in those years.

See generally id. This idea, if one takes it seriously (as one should, given its
inherent logic), could itself revolutionize current NEPA climate assessments; For
example, it would reverse the decisions involving forest practices by the USFS in
Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding USFS’s cursory
treatment of climate effects of logging and burning in an environmental
assessment on the grounds that the action was “small,” without applying any
cumulative impact analysis.), and Swomley v. Schroyer, 484 F. Supp. 3d 970, 977
(D. Colo. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1335 (declining to require the USFS to
discuss climate change impacts in great detail in the EA (citing Hapner, 621 F.3d
at 1242, 1245)).
133 Siegel & Loznak, supra note 111, at 7.
134 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Evaluating the Effects of Fossil Fuel Supply
Projects on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change under NEPA, 44 WM.
& MARY ENV’T. L. & POL’Y REV. 423, 426–27 (2020).
132

27

238

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

The study reveals a significant degree of foot-dragging on
NEPA compliance. No federal agency in the selected time period
concluded that an emissions impact would be significant or
prepared an EIS that discussed global warming.135 This includes
the Bureau of Land Management (the “BLM”), which during this
period engaged in extensive leasing of federal land to fossil fuel
companies for purposes of exploration and extraction.136 One would
expect outsize GHG emissions from these activities. For example,
the problem of venting and flaring of natural gas has been welldocumented,137 and the deleterious effects of escaping methane on
the Earth’s climate is well understood.138 In addition, the
“downstream” emissions resulting from these activities—i.e., the
transportation, distribution and especially combustion of the
fuels—release enormous quantities of GHG emissions into the
atmosphere.139 The “upstream” activities—e.g. transportation to
and construction of the projects—may also release their own large
quantities of GHG emissions.140
Yet all of the EAs conducted in connection with these
projects concluded that their climate effects were “not
significant.”141 Unsurprisingly, the agencies also “rarely” engaged
in CI analysis in their NEPA reviews, not even to add other recent
Siegel & Loznak, supra note 111, at 10.
See Burger & Wentz, supra note 134, at 427 (“[T]he federal government has
never conducted a programmatic analysis to evaluate the cumulative effects of its
leasing decisions or transport approvals on fossil fuel use and GHG emissions.
The result is a patchwork of project-level NEPA documentation that provides only
pieces of insight on how federal decisions about fossil fuel supply infrastructure
affect fossil fuel use and GHG emissions.”).
137 Blake A. Watson, Nullify, Postpone, Suspend, Stay, and Replace: The Trump
Administration and the Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 44 DAYTON L. REV. 363,
378–79 (2019).
138 See Steven Hamburg, What science is saying about methane pollution, and how
the
world
is
finally
listening,
EDF
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.edf.org/blog/2020/08/10/what-science-saying-about-methanepollution-and-how-world-finally-listening [https://perma.cc/M2DJ-F3HY].
139 See Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (requiring
emissions from downstream combustion of natural gas be considered in NEPA
climate assessments natural gas pipeline projects).
140 Siegel & Loznak, supra note 111, at 3–4.
141 See Id. at 28 ("the agencies’ decisions to produce EAs rather than EISs as their
NEPA documentation demonstrate the conclusion that the proposed projects’
environmental impacts were determined to be not significant and thus their GHG
emissions were determined to be not significant.")
135
136
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and reasonably foreseeable federal leases for fossil fuel production
to the scope of inquiry. It is highly doubtful that a study of the
cumulative results of all fossil fuel leases on U.S. government land
over the lifetime of the reserves, including their associated
upstream and downstream emissions, is an “insignificant” portion
of total world anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. 142 The failure to
produce this information as required by NEPA has deprived the
public of a valuable and necessary understanding of the climate
impact of government activities. It has also resulted in substantial
litigation, as environmental NGOs have brought one lawsuit after
another against the federal government, attempting to force the
agencies to comply with NEPA.143
The foregoing discussion on the failure by federal agencies
to adopt CI Analysis in their Climate Assessments has focused
exclusively on fossil fuel projects because the Sabin Center’s report
studied only federal action related to such projects.144 Nonetheless,
this article describes a similar lack of diligence by the U.S. Forest
Service in applying CI analysis in its NEPA climate assessments.
Why has the federal government been slow to embrace
proper climate assessments? One obvious answer might be simply
that the federal administration at the time of the Sabin Center
Survey belittled both climate science and efforts to avert climate
change. One might ask, however, whether the result would have
been the same had either the 2016 Guidance or the NEPA
Regulations themselves been more explicit about how federal
agencies must acquit their duty to undertake climate assessments
Available data would suggest that such aggregate GHG emissions from U.S.
government fossil fuel reserves is in fact a significant percentage of world totals.
See, e.g., California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 625 (N.D.Cal. 2020)
(“Between 2003 and 2014, appwaroximately 25% of all United States and 3–4%
of global fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions were attributable to federal coal, oil,
and gas resources leased and developed by the Interior Department.” (citations
omitted)); See also WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, 870 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
2017) (noting that just the three BLM leases at issue, involving coal mines in the
Powder River Basin of Wyoming, “would result in 382 million tons of annual
carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation, which is the equivalent of
roughly 6% of the United States’ total emissions in 2008.” (citations omitted)).
143 Burger & Wentz, supra note 134, at 427–28.
144 See Siegel & Loznak, supra note 111; Kate Aronoff, There's a climate crisis –
but Trump's cabinet continues to backtrack on science, Guardian (May 29, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/29/climate-crisisscience-trump-cabinet [https://perma.cc/EGE2-3QZM].
142
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under NEPA. If the Regulations had explicitly set forth what CI
analyses are required for climate assessments, provided binding
guidance for specific activities (such as the leasing of federal land),
required upstream and downstream analyses and, in general,
removed agency discretion in climate assessments, then an
administration that was hostile to environmental protections
would have had a harder time avoiding those assessments.
This circumstance, too, should guide the Biden
Administration in its deliberations over the future of NEPA
regulations. The Administration should not just strengthen the
regulations but should also consider ways to “hard-wire” them
against future hostile administrations.
D. Judicial Acceptance of CI Analysis in NEPA Reviews of
Climate Impacts
Part I of this article illustrates how, within less than a decade
after NEPA’s enactment, the U.S. judiciary became comfortable
with the idea that CI analysis is inherently part of NEPA
environmental assessment. It comes as no surprise, then, that
many courts are equally satisfied with the centrality of CI analysis
in understanding the nature of climate change.
For example, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit found that CI
analysis was a necessary requirement in a NEPA review related to
climate change. In Center for Biological Diversity v. National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration,145 eleven states
and four public interest groups had brought suit against the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA), challenging its emissions regulations (Corporate
Average Fuel Economy, or “CAFE” standards) for light trucks for
the manufacture years (“MYs”) 2005 to 2011. While NHTSA
acknowledged in its EA that passenger vehicles emitted GHGs
(mainly CO2) which contribute to global warming, it did not factor
global warming into the cost benefit analysis in its EA, arguing
“[t]he value of reducing emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse
gases [is] too uncertain to support their explicit valuation.”146 The
court found this failure to be arbitrary and capricious, since the
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 538 F.3d
1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2008).
146 Id. at 1192.
145

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol39/iss1/8

30

2022]

CUMULATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS

241

reduction in carbon emissions was “the most significant benefit of
more stringent CAFE standards,”147 and it remanded the case to
NHTSA, directing it to include a monetized value for CO2
emissions reduction. It also criticized NHTSA for failing to
consider the incremental impact of its standards in light of other
past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions, such as
establishing emissions limits for other light trucks and passenger
automobiles,148 stating that “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas
emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative
impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.”149 It
therefore directed the agency to provide “the necessary contextual
information” about the cumulative impacts of its regulation “in
light of other CAFE rulemakings and other past, present and
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency or
other person undertakes such other actions.”150
Thus, the court ordered NHTSA to cast a wide net in scoping
its CI analysis. The Court did not, however, give explicit guidance
on what the scope should be, other than to suggest that other light
truck and passenger automobiles should be included.151
Determining the proper scope of CI analysis is never easy, and in
the case of GHG emissions it is particularly difficult. As explained
in Part III of this article, agencies should apply a rule of reason in
determining the proper scope for CI analysis. This means they
should select a range of different sets of GHG sources for their CI
analysis that produce the most useful information to the agency
and to the public for understanding the climate threat to which the
agency action is contributing.
In the decade since the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center
for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration, federal district courts, taking direction from the
Ninth Circuit and from other federal circuit courts,152 have become
very comfortable with CI analysis in NEPA climate assessments
and adept at imposing it. In the 2020 case California v.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1216.
149 Id. at 1217.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1216.
152 See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. BLM, 387 F.3d 989 at 997 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding tiering EAs did not cure deficiencies in cumulative impact
analysis).
147
148
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Bernhardt,153 for example, the State of California and various
environmental groups challenged the decision of the Bureau of
Land Management (“BLM”) to rescind the Methane Waste
Prevention Rule, a rule promulgated under the prior (Obama)
Administration’s BLM to limit the leakage of methane, a
dangerous GHG, from natural gas wells on federal land.154 The
plaintiffs alleged, in part, that BLM’s EIS describing the effects of
the rescission did not take into consideration its cumulative effects
“when combined with [the BLM’s] nationwide oil and gas
program.”155 BLM countered that projected emissions caused by
the rescission of the Rule amounted to “less than 1% of total United
States methane emissions.”156 The Court rejected that excuse and,
citing other Federal district court decisions - rather than the 1978
Regulations,157 required the BLM to study the cumulative impact
of the rescission “when combined with its nationwide oil and gas
program, also known as the ‘fossil fuel program.’”158
Similarly, in San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United States
Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico, reviewing the BLM’s proposal to lease out
13 parcels of federal land in the San Juan Basin, rejected the
BLM’s EA for not considering downstream emissions (largely
combustion by customers) and for a weak cumulative impact
analysis.159
The two cases mentioned above, California v. Bernhardt
and San Juan Citizens Alliance v. United State Bureau of Land
Management, are significant in that they were decided during a
California v. Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d 573, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
152 See id.
154 See Watson, supra note 137, at 365–66.
155 Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
156 Id. at 623.
157 E.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp. 3d 41, 75–77 (D.D.C. 2019)
(requiring BLM to include its nation-wide leasing program in an NEPA
assessment); Ctr.. For Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind
of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.”).
158 Bernhardt, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
159 San Juan Citizens All. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227,
1248 (D.N.M. 2018) (“Without further explanation, the facile conclusion that this
particular impact is minor and therefore ‘would not produce climate change
impacts that differ from the No Action Alternative,’ is insufficient to comply with
[the 1978 Regulations] Section 1508.7 [the definition of cumulative impact]”).
153
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time when the Administration, including the political appointees
of federal agencies, was highly dismissive of climate change. The
federal judiciary demonstrated unwavering resolve in demanding
from the agencies the same “hard look” at the effects of GHG
emissions from agency action as they would with respect to the
effects of any other pollutant. In doing so, the courts reinforced the
importance of CI analysis. Nonetheless, as will be seen in the next
section, the Administration was determined to bring an abrupt end
both to NEPA Climate Assessments and to the judiciary’s
consistent support thereof, and it would accomplish this by
abolishing the concept of “cumulative effects” from NEPA
jurisprudence.
E. Development Arrested: Trump-era CEQ Regulations
On January 10, 2020, in the last full year of the Trump
Administration, CEQ published a notice of proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register proposing to “update” the NEPA
Regulations.160 The proposal was nothing less than breathtaking
for its sweep of proposed revisions. The “update” revised every
section of the Regulations. The effect of virtually each revision was
the same: to weaken NEPA for the purpose of eliminating or
drastically simplifying the process of environmental assessment to
the extent CEQ deemed legally possible. The proposal generated
over one million comments, mostly critical of the changes.161 After
an unusually accelerated comment period, CEQ issued final
regulations on July 16, 2020, less than six months after the initial
proposal.162 Most of the critical comments had been ignored, and
little of the initial proposal had been changed.163 The new
regulations effected an astounding setback to five decades of the
development of NEPA law.
Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the
NEPA, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (Jul. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 1500–
1508.2) [hereinafter Updated Procedural NEPA].
161 See id.; see also Council of Env’t Quality, RIN 0331-AA03, Update to the
Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, Final Rule Response to Comments, at 4 (June 30,
2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/document/CEQ-2019-0003-720629
[https://perma.cc/SMA8-8ESJ].
162 Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508, 1515–1518).
163 See generally id.
160
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Significantly, the CEQ eliminated the distinctions among
“direct,” “indirect” and “cumulative effect,” and combined the three
into “reasonably foreseeable effects.”164 Clearly, however,
“cumulative effects” are an entirely different kind of “effect.” They
are included in the 1978 Regulations to force an entirely different
kind of analysis than that for direct/indirect effects—namely, to
require the agencies to aggregate the effects of related actions.
Thus, “simplifying” the definition of “effects” to eliminate
cumulative effects results in the rejection of that additional
analysis entirely. In case the goal of the “simplification” might be
too subtle, the new Regulations state in the definition of “effects or
impacts”: “Cumulative impact, defined in 40 CFR 1508.7 (1978), is
repealed.”165
The 2020 Regulations were, of course, legally able to repeal
the 1978 Regulations on cumulative impact, but what about the
substantial case law that requires CI analysis in appropriate
instances? The CEQ believed it could overturn that entire
jurisprudence, too, simply by deleting the definition of “cumulative
impact” from the definitional section of the Regulations. It
reasoned that all NEPA case law derives from the 1978
Regulations, and thus can be changed or eliminated simply by
amending the Regulations.166 As CEQ stated in the release
accompanying the 2020 Regulations:
Existing NEPA case law inevitably rests directly on
interpretive choices made in the 1978 regulations or on cases that
themselves through some chain of prior cases also trace to the 1978
regulations. Yet consistent with Chevron, CEQ's NEPA
regulations are subject to change.167
Regarding “cumulative effects,” the CEQ says:
Nor are the terms “direct,” “indirect,” or “cumulative” included
in the text of the statute. CEQ created those concepts and included
them in the 1978 regulations.168
See Updated Procedural NEPA, 85 Fed. Reg at 43,331 supra note 160. See also
SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 15 at 47.
165 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(g)(3) (2020).
166 See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43305 (July 16, 2020).
167 Updated Procedural NEPA, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,342 supra note 160.
168 Id. at 43,343.
164
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As this article demonstrates, however, both of the above
statements are inaccurate. Many if not most federal courts had
some role in creating case law directly out of the NEPA statute
before the 1978 Regulations were promulgated.169 CI analysis is
part of that case law.
It is clear that the Trump-era CEQ was targeting, at least
in part, the elimination of climate assessments in its “repeal” of CI
analysis. As illustrated above, it is difficult if not impossible under
NEPA to require an assessment of the climate effects of only one
particular agency action or even “connected”170 actions, because
even the largest sources of GHG emissions in the U.S. represent a
vanishingly small percentage of all global warming and related
phenomena.171 For this reason, any EA assessment of just one
source of GHGs always fails the “significance” threshold and leads
to a FONSI. Thus, the Trump-era CEQ’s elimination of CI analysis
has the effect of also eliminating climate assessment from the
purview of NEPA.172 In making this change, the CEQ essentially
hardwired the One Percent Problem into NEPA.

F. The Biden Administration promises a broad revision.
Immediately upon taking office on January 20, 2021,
President Joe Biden issued several executive orders establishing a
strong commitment to the environment generally and to the fight
against global warming in particular. One such executive order
was EO 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis,173 the first section
of which establishes the Administration’s policy of “listen[ing] to
See infra Part I.B.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (1978) (defining “connected actions” as “closely
related and therefore should be discussed in the same impact statement. Actions
are connected if they: (i) Automatically trigger other actions which may require
environmental impact statements, (ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other
actions are taken previously or simultaneously, or (iii) Are interdependent parts
of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.").
171
See
Global
Greenhouse
Gas
Emissions
Data,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
[https://perma.cc/5QMQ-WKFB].
172 See generally id.
173 Exec. Order No. 13,990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
169
170
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the science” in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among
achieving other environmental goals.174 Section 2 of the executive
order requires federal agencies to review their regulations for
consistency with the policies established in Section 1.175 The fact
sheet accompanying the executive order explicitly states that CEQ
will review the 2020 Regulations for consistency with the new
policies.176
One might have expected CEQ to swiftly begin the process
of revoking the 2020 Regulations and to either re-implement the
1978 Regulations or develop new NEPA regulations. Instead,
however, CEQ’s efforts to address the 2020 Regulations have been
begun tepidly. On June 29, 2021, CEQ issued an interim final rule
that extended from September 14, 2021 to September 14, 2023, the
deadline for federal agencies to conform their NEPA Regulations
to the 2020 Regulations.177 Then, on October 7, 2021, CEQ filed a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking178 that constitutes what it calls
“Phase 1” in its plan to develop new NEPA regulations (the “Phase
1 NPRM”).
This Phase would modestly make only three
amendments to the 2020 Regulations, the third of which, in
substance, reinstates the definitions of “direct effect,” “indirect
effect” and “cumulative effect” to those contained in the 1978
Regulations.179
According to the Phase 1 NPRM, in Phase 2 CEQ will more
broadly revisit the 2020 NEPA Regulations and propose further
revisions to ensure that the NEPA process provides for efficient
Id.
See id. at 7,037-39.
176 Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-agency-actions-for-review
[https://perma.cc/N4X2-MXF8]; Exec. Order No. 14,000, Tackling the Climate
Crisis at Home and Abroad, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619, 7,626 (Jan. 27, 2021) (on January
27, the White House issued an additional executive order, which directs the CEQ
and the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that all federal
infrastructure projects reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that climate
considerations factor into all agency decisions).
177 Deadline for Agencies to Propose Updates to National Environmental Policy
Act Procedures, 86 Fed. Reg. 34,154 (June 29, 2021) (amending 40 C.F.R. §
1507.3).
178 National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 86
Fed. Reg. 55,757 (proposed Oct. 7, 2021).
179 See infra Part I.B.
174
175
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and effective environmental reviews that are consistent with the
statute’s text and purpose, provides regulatory certainty to
Federal agencies; promotes better decision making consistent with
NEPA’s statutory requirements; and meets environmental,
climate change, and environmental justice objectives.180
This statement, then, gives the welcome impression that
the Biden-Era CEQ will modernize NEPA’s regulations to better
address current environmental problems—important among
them, global warming. The 2021 NPRM takes the first step in this
direction with the proposal to reinstate the definition of
“cumulative effects” in the regulations and thereby restore CI
Analysis as a necessary part of NEPA assessments. Without CI
Analysis reassuming its natural place the NEPA process, true
NEPA climate assessments would be impossible.
The next part of this article will recommend that CEQ, in
Part 2 of its overhaul of the NEPA regulations, dedicate a section
specifically tailored to the development of climate assessments.
III.
Whither NEPA Climate Assessments? Towards
a Revised Approach
This article has sketched the development of the concept of
CI analysis from its origins in the first CEQ guidance issued to
interpret NEPA. It has demonstrated that courts have treated the
tool as implicitly part of a meaningful environmental assessment
process. Moreover, as public awareness of and concern over global
warming has grown, CEQ has recommended, and certain federal
courts have insisted on, CI analysis in assessing federal actions
causing GHG emissions. An important contribution in this regard
was the Obama-era CEQ’s Guidance on climate assessment. It
recognized that all climate assessment is CI analysis and urged
federal agencies to focus on estimating net GHG emissions from
their activities.181
The Biden Administration inherited NEPA Regulations,
proposed and promulgated by the CEQ of the last Administration,
that vitiate CI analysis and cripple, perhaps fatally, any NEPA
review related to climate change.
Proposing new NEPA
National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations Revisions, 86
Fed. Reg. 55,757 at 55,759 (no date has been given for the start of Phase 2).
181 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 17, 26.
180
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regulations and enacting them through the process established in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) would seem CEQ’s
natural response, but will be so draining in terms of resources (e.g.
time and staff attention) that the Administration might have been
tempted to simply reinstate the 1978 Regulations. Had it done so,
however, the Administration would have missed an opportunity to
advance the law of NEPA climate assessments.
Fortunately, we now know this will not be the case. As
mentioned in Subsection II (F), CEQ has announced its intention
to “broadly revisit” the 2020 Regulations and propose revisions
that meet “environmental, climate change and environmental
justice objectives.”182 This will occur in Phase 2 of the process
initiated with the Phase 1 NPRM, and has the potential for
constituting a fresh approach for assessments of climate change
impacts and freeing them from some of the difficulties noted
herein.
This article will next discuss the following issues that might
guide the development of a new set of NEPA regulations focused
on climate assessments: (A) why agency climate assessments
should not have to address the ultimate, indirect effects of GHG
emissions; (B) how to determine, or “scope,” the universe of sources
that should be considered in CI analysis, and (C) how to determine
the threshold of “significance” of likely climate effects for purposes
of determining whether an EIS must be prepared pursuant to
NEPA Section 102(2)(C).
A. Agencies should not have to research the ultimate effects of
their actions on the Earth’s climate; they should instead
incorporate by reference a pan-agency programmatic EIS for this
information.
GHGs are fungible, in that their cumulative effects on the
environment are the same regardless of the source of the emission,
where it is located, or which federal agency bears responsibility for
them.183 A given volume of, say, CO2, emitted over a given period
See
Global
Greenhouse
Gas
Emissions
Data,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
[https://perma.cc/Y4XE-QMD2].
183 Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for
Greenhouse
Gases,
Ctr.
for
Climate
&
Energy
Sols.,
182
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of time, mixes with all other CO2 volumes in the entire atmosphere
circling Earth, and adds to the greenhouse effect that is warming
the entire planet.184 As stated in the Obama-era Guidance,
emissions are a proxy for those effects. They have been well studied
by legions of climate scientists around the world, and are the
subject of many thorough, well-regard reports, such as the reports
written by the IPCC and the USGCRP.185 It is therefore pointless
for each federal agency to research anew what these effects are. A
“programmatic Climate EIS” that describes the climate effects of
net GHG emissions would increase the efficiency and accuracy of
this part of the NEPA process for climate assessments.
Moves toward programmatic EISs concentrating on the
climate effects of net GHG emissions have already been well under
way. For example, the George W. Bush-era CEQ encouraged tiered
approaches to CI analysis,186 and many agencies themselves
already engage in it. But the process can become more streamlined
by the development of only one programmatic Climate EIS for the
benefit of all federal agencies. The USGCRP is an excellent
candidate for the task, because it is an interagency organization
that already supplies climate change information to the
agencies.187 USGCRP authorship has the political advantage of
being a domestic organization (unlike the IPCC), and it has
already demonstrated independence from the U.S politics (unlike
most federal agencies, including the CEQ and the EPA).188

https://www.c2es.org/document/emissions-trading-in-the-u-s-experience-lessonsand-considerations-for-greenhouse-gases/ [https://perma.cc/HPH6-7EZY].
184 See 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 10-11.
185 Reports, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/reports/ [https://perma.cc/N5S9-2PAB];
Reports
Library,
U.S.
Global
Change
Rsch.
Prog.,
https://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports
[https://www.globalchange.gov/browse/reports].
186 The 2005 CEQ Guidance on cumulative impact does not mention climate
assessments, but implicitly provides some support for a programmatic EIS on
climate effects. See 2005 CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 85, at 2, 3.
187 See USGCRP 2017, supra note 123.
188 The USGCRP’s 2017 special report on climate change, which was researched
and published during the Trump Administration, concludes, “[s]ince [our prior
report], stronger evidence has emerged for continuing, rapid, human-caused
warming of the global atmosphere and ocean. This report concludes that ‘it is
extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the
observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last
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Freeing the agencies from the task of describing the climate
effects of net GHG emissions would allow them to focus their
NEPA climate assessments on predicting volumes of GHG gases
emitted over given periods of time from proposed projects and
other agency actions. 189 The alternatives analysis, for example,
should logically compare volumes of net-GHG emissions, not
effects on Earth’s climate. Care should be taken, however, to
ensure that the conclusions of the programmatic Climate EIS are
not hidden from readers of project-specific EISs, in order to
reinforce the real-world effect of the project’s GHG emissions. The
project-specific EIS should quote the programmatic EIS on the
likely climate effects of cumulative GHG emissions, and electronic
versions of the project-specific EIS should include links to relevant
sections of the programmatic Climate EIS for easy reference.190
B. The rule of reason should guide agency determination of the
scope of GHG sources that must be considered for CI analysis.
As stated above, the new regulations for climate change
review should closely align with the principles tentatively set forth
by the Obama-era CEQ in its 2016 Guidelines. The most important
of these principles includes the observation that there is no
difference between the direct, indirect and cumulative effects of
GHG emissions. All effects of GHG emissions are cumulative,
because GHGs freely mix around the world and have a global

century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent
of the observational evidence.” Id. at 12. In contrast, it is inconceivable that the
CEQ would have made a similar statement in 2017, given the then-current
politicization of the climate issue by the Administration it reported to.
189 The Sabin Center’s “Deep Decarbonization” Pathways Project goes farther, and
recommends that, even outside of NEPA, all federal agencies should continually
monitor the GHG emissions from projects over which they are responsible.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 11–12, (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds., 2018).
190 Relieving agencies from having to study climate effects of their actions and to
focus simply on calculating net GHG emissions has an additional benefit.
Currently, some agencies avoid climate assessments, especially those using CI
analysis, under the pretext that it is too difficult to predict climate effects from
their actions. By assigning the description of climate effects to a third party,
however, such as to the USGCRP, that pretext for inaction is eliminated. See, e.g.,
U.S. FOREST SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS IN PROJECT LEVEL NEPA
ANALYSIS 5 (2009).
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impact, while no one source of emissions “significantly” impacts
Earth’s climate when considered in isolation.191
The question remains, however, what to do with this fact,
and, in particular, how to determine what GHG sources should be
included in the cumulative impact review. The 1978 Regulations
defined cumulative impact to include the impact of the action
under review “when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or
non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.”192
Obviously the words “or person,” without even any geographic
restriction, has the potential to enormously expand the universe of
potential sources to be studied. For climate change purposes, that
universe could theoretically expand to billions of sources—e.g., to
anything that emits a GHG. A scope for CI analysis that includes
too many sources could result in a meaningless or useless EIS, thus
violating the central tenet of the rule of reason.193
The logical solution would be to limit, during the “scoping
phase” of the NEPA process, the scope to those actions that are
“related” to the Federal action under review. 194 New regulations,
employing the rule of reason, should give agencies guidance in
defining “related” in such a way so that the CI analysis is
sufficiently broad but still relates relevant and meaningful
information to the public and the agencies, permitting them to

See 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 10-11.
1978 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §1508.7 (emphasis added).
193 See Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008)
1216 The Court in that case suggested that the NHTSA’s EA for CAFE standards
for a certain class of light trucks consider the cumulative environmental effect of
those standards when considered with “other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable actions such as other light truck and passenger automobile CAFE
standards.” Id. Perhaps the CI scope could be expanded to include light trucks
and passenger automobiles produced domestically and internationally for
offshore markets, since those markets are influenced directly and indirectly by
U.S. standards.
194 1978 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §1508.25(a)(2). Under the 1978 regulations,
“scope” incorporates a definition of “cumulative actions”: those actions “which
when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts
and should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement.” Id.
191
192
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make informed judgments among alternative actions, including a
no-action alternative.195
For example, if the NHTSA has proposed CAFE standards
for a particular class and model year (“MY”) of motor vehicle,
“related” sources for the purpose of CI analysis might include (a)
emissions from all U.S.-manufactured motor vehicles of all MYs of
the particular class of vehicles, occurring in the past and the
present, and are reasonably certain to occur in the future, or (b) all
emissions from all U.S.-manufactured motor vehicles of all classes
of vehicles, or (c) any combination of (a) and/or (b). Since
technologies produced for once class of vehicle can be employed in
other classes, perhaps a CI analysis should include multiple
vehicle classes, including both technical/design enhancements of
emissions control systems and improved gas mileage
requirements. Moreover, U.S. automobile standards may exert
such direct and indirect influence on foreign manufacturers as well
as foreign regulators that a CI analysis should include automobiles
produced around the world. Thus, where the NHTSA might be
confronted with the narrow question whether all new light trucks
of a given MY manufactured in the U.S. should be required to
employ control system X, the CI analysis of that question should
be much broader. It might become broad enough to include foreign
markets influenced by the U.S. over, say, the next ten years. That
analysis could produce information of interest to both NHTSA and
to the public at large; under a rule of reason, this is a sufficient
rationale to require it.
Scoping the CI analysis for Climate Assessments—that is,
defining those world-wide GHG emissions that “accumulate” with
the proposed project’s emissions for purposes of determining
cumulative effect—is not straightforward. It would be impossible
to prescribe a CI scope for all projects of all agencies, and yet
leaving the scoping decision entirely to agency discretion would
invite them to game the analysis. The only possible yardstick is
It has long been well settled that a “rule of reason” should guide environmental
assessments. This is usually understood as requiring environmental assessments
and environmental impact statements to focus on providing useful information.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,373–74
(1989); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (describing the “hard
look” tempered by a “rule of reason); Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S.
752, 767 (2004).
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found in the original purpose of NEPA, which is to produce useful
information for decision-makers and the public. Ultimately, each
federal agency must be required to define the CI scope to be those
sets of emissions that, when CI analysis is applied to them, best
guide the agency in the decisions it faces, in particular the choice
among alternative actions.196
C. “Significance” thresholds in NEPA climate assessments
should be determined in a pan-agency programmatic EIS.
As previously discussed, NEPA requires an agency to
prepare an EIS for all major agency actions that are “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”197 “Significance”
is typically determined in the EA stage of the NEPA process.198
This section discusses how best to determine “significance” in
climate assessments.
The 1978 Regulations state that “’[s]ignificantly’…requires
considerations of both context and intensity.”199 “Context” means
the “setting of the proposed action.” “200Intensity” is to be
determined by application of a 10-part test related to the impacts
of the proposed action.201
Federal agencies should not be required to undertake
“context” and “intensity” analysis with respect to each climate
assessment they undertake. Since impacts of a given volume of
GHG emissions are the same regardless of the source or the
location of the source,202 “significance” for purposes of climate
assessments should simply be defined by stated volumes of each
GHG (or by “CO2-equivalent”—meaning, for any GHG, the
equivalent volume of CO2 that has the same warming potential as
See 40 C.F.R. Section 1502.14 (1978)(“[Alternatives analysis] is the heart of
the environmental impact statement.”).
197 NEPA §102(2)(C).
198 See 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at §§ 1508.9,1501.3 (defining
“environmental assessment” and “when to prepare an environmental
assessment”).
199 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at §1508.27.
200 Id.
201 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at § 1508.27(a)–(b).
202 Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, and Considerations for
Greenhouse
Gases,
Ctr.
for
Climate
&
Energy
Sols.,
https://www.c2es.org/document/emissions-trading-in-the-u-s-experience-lessonsand-considerations-for-greenhouse-gases/ [https://perma.cc/Z3ZJ-MQTG].
196
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the GHG). This follows from the fungible nature of GHGs and the
observation in the 2016 Guidance, discussed above, that, for
GHGs, “volume is a proxy for impacts.” 203 By focusing the
“significance” inquiry on volumes of GHGs rather than ultimate
climate effects, the agencies would be freed from having to
undertake the complicated “significance” balancing test set forth
in the 1978 Regulations in climate assessments.
Three sets of volumetric thresholds should be produced for
each GHG. The first would be applied with respect to direct
impacts—that is, to GHG emissions that are a direct result of the
agency action; and the second would be applied to indirect
impacts—for example, in the case of a BLM fossil fuel lease,
“downstream” GHG emissions from fossil fuel extraction from the
lease. Finally, volumetric “significance” thresholds should be
applied to cumulative effects—e.g., to GHG emissions arising from
same or similar types of agency practices as the individual action
under review. This would have the advantage of preventing
“segmentation” in the significance determination. For example, in
Hapner v. Tidwell204 and Swomley v. Schroyer,205 both addressing
the sufficiency of USFS NEPA reviews, neither court effectively
applied the seventh factor (cumulative impact) of the significance
determination before determining that certain logging and
burning practices did not “significantly” affect global warming.
Their FONSIs may have been accurate with respect to the
individual logging and burning plans at issue in each case. But the
USFS should determine if the types of logging and burning
practices it permits on U.S. forests produce cumulative GHG
emissions that should be reviewed and compared to the emissions
of alternative practices.
As mentioned in Section 2, above, the Obama-era CEQ was
hesitant to prescribe or even suggest levels of GHG emissions that
meet the threshold of “significance.”206 The result was that Trumpera agencies were highly inconsistent in the methodologies of
determining the “significance” of their net GHG emissions, as
demonstrated by the above-cited Sabin Center study into fossil2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118, at 51866.
Hapner v. Tildwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1245. (9th Cir. 2010).
205 Swomley v. Schroyer, 484 F. Supp. 3d 970, 980 (D. Colo. 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-1335 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 2020).
206 See generally 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 118.
203
204

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol39/iss1/8

44

2022]

CUMULATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS

255

fuel related NEPA inquiries between 2017 and 2018.207 Indeed, all
of the agencies reviewed in the study determined that none of their
emissions were “significantly affecting the human environment”
and therefore did not require EISs.208 This result is simply
inconsistent with the fact that U.S. agency actions are, in fact, a
major contributor of world-wide GHGs,209 especially those agencies
approving or otherwise facilitating fossil fuel projects in the years
studied by the Sabin Center (2017 and 2018).
New NEPA regulations should remedy these weaknesses.
One consequence of the fungible nature of GHG emissions is that
the volume thresholds for “significance” can be determined in one
process and applied to all NEPA climate reviews. Thus, the new
regulations should “hard-wire” the “significance” determination in
climate assessments across the federal agencies, preferably in the
programmatic EIS recommended above. Just as an independent
body, such as the USGCRP, should describe the climate impacts of
given volumes of GHG emissions, that group should supply the
scientific data to CEQ necessary to assign volumetric “significance”
levels for each GHG in a programmatic EIS. 210 In doing so, CEQ
may wish to refer to the ten factors set forth in the “significantly”
definition of the 1978 Regulations.211 Developing threshold
“significance” levels in a programmatic EIS (rather than, say, by
regulation) has the additional advantage of permitting levels of
significance to be more easily modified over time, as our
understanding of the effects of GHGs on climate change becomes
more advanced. By establishing generic volumetric levels of
“significance,” the Administration will be harmonizing an
approach to climate change across the federal government.
CONCLUSION
The Biden Administration now has an opportunity that
prior administrations might have envied. Given the inherent
weaknesses of the Trump-era NEPA Regulations currently in
effect, it might be relatively easy to build political momentum
Siegel & Loznak, supra note 111.
Id. at 3.
209 See USGCRP 2017, supra note 123.
210 This opens another line of inquiry: Whether Subchapter 2 of NEPA, which
establishes the CEQ, can form the basis of CEQ’s authority to undertake its own
NEPA review and author its own EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500–08.
211 1978 Regulations, supra note 2, at §1508.27(b).
207
208
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behind new regulations. These new regulations can be sensibly
adapted to and focused on the most serious environmental crisis
facing the world: the climate crisis.
Those regulations and the robust climate EISs they should
require could, in turn, build further momentum for our country to
address global warming far more ambitiously than has hitherto
been the case. A programmatic Climate Effects EIS—one that
links the rates of cumulative GHG emissions resulting from
specific agency actions to particular climate harms (rising sea
levels, climate migrations, biodiversity loss, etc.)—could be an
important catalyst for a nation-wide discussion of the outsize
contribution our federal government has made and continues to
make towards an impending climate disaster. At that point, the
American public would be better equipped to understand the true
environmental costs of individual agency projects and decisions.
The information derived from this new NEPA process can soon
enter the national debate on the federal government’s response to
the climate crisis at the very time our new U.S. President is calling
our country to action.
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